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PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
V. 
STANLEY FIEEIKI, Case No. 20050459-CA 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. 
: Not Incarcerated 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE CITY'S BRIEF CONTAINS 
SIGNIFICANT FACTUAL INACCURACIES. 
In its Statement of Facts, the City indicates that "At the hearing, the parties 
stipulated that there was no negotiation between Mr. Brass and Mr. Torriente (R. 328: 
52). While Fieeiki maintains that the prosecutor who was controlling the plea 
negotiations in his case was John Huber (Hearing Exhibit 1; R. 328: 5-7), there was no 
stipulation that there was no negotiation between Mr, Brass and Mr. Torriente. Page 52 
of R. 328 reflects the parties stipulating that there were no plea negotiations between 
Brass and Torriente prior to the interview, and agreeing with the court that the transcript 
of the interview between Torriente, Nudd and Fieeiki, would speak for itself This page 
of the transcript is in the addendum to this brief. 
The City argues that 
Mr. Brass conceded that it was not impossible that a plea in abeyance was 
not offered prior to the September 9th interview and that the interview may 
have been conducted in an effort to assist the prosecution in making an 
appropriate charging decision or not making one at all (R. 328: 15-16). 
City's brief at 9. 
Reading Brass's testimony at R, 328: 15-16 confirms that while Brass conceded 
the possibility that his recall was incorrect, Brass's recollection was that he took Fieeiki to 
the interview with Nudd and Torriente in an effort to improve upon Huber's offer of a 
plea in abeyance, and that Fieeiki's statements to Nudd and Torriente were made in 
pursuit of the plea bargain. The transcripts pages including all of Brass's testimony are in 
the addendum to this brief. 
The City's last factual assertion in its Statement of Facts, is that "Fieeiki testified 
his expectation at the meeting was to tell the prosecutors what happened. (R. 328: 68)." 
By reviewing that transcript page, in the addendum to this brief, the Court can readily 
confirm that Fieeiki went to the interview with the intent to 
tell them what happened and to get this matter resolved by a dismissal, not 
by - not accepting a plea in abeyance. Hopefully maybe something other 
than a plea in abeyance. But that was all that was on the table at that time. 
(R. 328: 68). 
In its Argument, the City asserts that Brass stated that his understanding of the 
purpose of the meeting between Fieeiki and Nudd and Torriente was for Fieeiki "to be 
able to present his side of the story." City's brief at 16. By reviewing Brass's affidavit 
and testimony, which are in the addendum to this brief, this Court can confirm that 
2 
Brass's testimony and affidavit both establish that Fieeiki's purpose in going to the 
interview was to settle the case. 
In writing its opinion in this case, this Court should not rely on the foregoing 
factual inaccuracies in the City's brief, 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS 
WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The City discusses the marshaling requirement in its Statement of the Issues, 
City's brief at 2, and argues in its Summary of the Argument that this Court should 
conclude that the trial court's finding that Fieeiki's statements to Nudd and Torriente 
were part of the investigation rather than made in pursuit of a plea bargain is "not clearly 
erroneous and is amply supported by the record." City's brief at 11. 
However, the City never addresses or refutes Fieeiki's marshaling of the evidence 
or detailed arguments that the trial court's rulings contained numerous clearly erroneous 
factual findings, which render it unreliable and require reversal. Compare Fieeiki's 
opening brief at 12-19 with City's brief at 1-21. 
Fieeiki stands by his marshaling of the evidence and unrefuted arguments 
challenging the trial court's clearly erroneous and outcome-determinative factual 
findings. See Fieeiki's opening brief at 12-19. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS 
WERE LEGALLY INCORRECT. 
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In response to Fieeiki's argument that the trial court was legally in error in ruling 
that Brass should have expressly noted that the Nudd-Torriente-Fieeiki interview was 
privileged as part of the negotiation process, Fieeiki's opening brief at 20-22, the City 
cites People v. Taylor. 682 N.E.2d 310, 313014 (111. App. 4th Dist. 1997). 
Taylor, a state court decision, obviously does not control over the Supreme Court's 
decision in United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995), which recognizes a 
criminal defendant's right not to be impeached with plea negotiation statements under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 410, and that the right not to be impeached is a right which 
must be expressly waived. Given the persuasive nature of authority under the federal rule 
which is the Utah Rule verbatim, Mezzanato establishes the error of Fieeiki's judge's 
ruling that his right was waived silently, by his lawyer's failure to assert it. See id at 207-
09. 
Taylor does not control this case, because it does not apply rules identical to Utah 
Rules of Evidence 408 * or 410,2 but was instead applying Illinois Supreme Court Rule 
!Rule 408 provides: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) 
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in 
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as 
to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or 
invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements 
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does 
not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely 
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule 
also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
4 
402(f), which provided: 
"If a plea discussion does not result in a plea of guilty, or if a plea of guilty 
is not accepted or is withdrawn, or if judgment on a plea of guilty is 
reversed on direct or collateral review, neither the plea discussion nor any 
resulting agreement, plea, or judgment shall be admissible against the 
defendant in any criminal proceeding." 
Iaylor,468RE.2dat312. 
Taylor is factually disparate from the instant case, because Taylor did not have a 
lawyer who arranged his police interview through a prosecutor in an effort to settle the 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a 
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. 
2Rule 410 provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, 
in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who 
made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure 
regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney 
for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which 
result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. 
However, such a statement is admissible (I) in any proceeding wherein 
another statement made in the course of the, same plea or plea discussions 
has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered 
contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or 
false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on 
the record and in the presence of counsel. 
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case, as Fieeiki did. Rather, to facilitate the execution of a search warrant, Taylor was 
required to open a church where he worked, and was then brought to the police station by 
the police for an interview, which began with a Miranda warning, lasted an hour and 
forty-five minutes, involved no defense lawyer or prosecutor. It was shortly following 
this interview that Taylor was arrested. Id. at 311-312. Taylor worked as an "auxiliary 
police officer," and knew the officers who interrogated him, and in the course of the 
interrogation, Taylor mentioned his prior no contest plea to a traffic offense, and inquired 
what would happen if he pled no contest to the sexual assault complaint the officers were 
investigating. The officers told them they did not know, as they had no control over it. 
Id. at 312. In rejecting Taylor's claim that his no contest plea inquiry should be excluded 
under Rule 402(f), supra, the court applied essentially the same test Fieeiki asserts on 
page 28 of his opening brief and the City discusses on pages 13 and 14 of its brief- by 
assessing whether Taylor had a subjective belief that he was negotiating a plea, and then 
by assessing whether that belief was objectively reasonable given the totality of the 
circumstances. Taylor at 312.3 
In applying the test, the Taylor court noted that there were no lawyers involved, 
but that Taylor was talking with his fellow officers, relaying an anecdote about his prior 
3The City's brief notes that some courts feel that the test relied on by Fieeiki should be 
supplanted with a "totality of the circumstances" test. City's brief at 14 and n.4. However, given 
that the second prong of Fieeiki's test considers all facts, and that his subjective expectations 
would seem to be part of the "totality of the circumstances," it does not appear that the new test 
applied by some federal courts is materially different from the one Fieeiki applies. 
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traffic case, and merely inquiring about his fellow officers' opinions about a no-contest 
resolution in the sexual assault case, rather than actually offering to plead no contest. 
Taylor at 313-314. 
In contrast here, the entire interview was arranged by Fieeiki's lawyer and the 
prosecutor in an effort to resolve the criminal case, and the record demonstrates Fieeiki's 
objectively reasonable subjective belief that the purpose of the interview was to settle his 
case, rather than to aid the police in their investigation. See, e.g., Fieiiki's opening brief 
at 28. 
The City's reliance on United States v. Penta. 889 F.2d 815 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 
498 U.S. 896 (1990), is similarly misplaced, because in Penta, there was no interview 
arranged between prosecuting and defense attorneys in the course of case settlement 
efforts as there was here. Instead, Penta attended numerous interviews with a prosecuting 
attorney and investigator who were working to build a case against Penta's associates. 
Penta feared that the prosecutor would charge him as well, and in the course of 
cooperating with the prosecutor repeatedly asked what was going to happen to him. Id. at 
816-17. While it appeared that Penta was trying to obtain lenience from the prosecutor, 
he never directly asked for it, and the prosecutor never offered it. Id- In contrast here, 
Fieeiki hired a lawyer, who approached the prosecutor and arranged for the interview in 
the course of settling the case. 
The City's other case, People v. Jones, 734 N.E.2d 207, 213 (III App.3d 2000), 
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overruled on other grounds. 757 N.E.2d 464 (111. 2001), is likewise inapposite, because it 
involved a defendant without a lawyer who repeatedly spoke with the police, who 
repeatedly told him they were not in a position to make a deal. The defendant did not 
believe that his statements were part of a plea agreement or a preliminary step to a plea 
agreement. See Jones, 734 N.E.2d at 213. In contrast here, Fieeiki reasonably believed 
that his statements made to the police under his lawyer's instructions and with his lawyer 
present, were made in the course of his lawyer's efforts to settle the case. Accordingly, 
his statements should have been excluded under both Utah Rules of Evidence 408 and 
410, supra. See Fieeiki's opening brief at 22-29. 
The City argues that the Fieeiki interview is properly viewed as investigative, 
rather than as a settlement negotiation, because there was no evidence of Fieeiki's 
offering to enter any specific plea, and no evidence ofa quid pro quo. City's brief at 14-
16. 
Particularly given that Nudd and Torriente were acting as Huber's agents in the 
course of Huber's settlement negotiations with Brass, and that Huber was the prosecutor 
with the power to specify the ultimate terms of the settlement, there was no reason for 
Brass or Fieiiki to try and specify the exact terms of the settlement in the course of the 
interview with Nudd and Torriente. See Fieeiki's opening brief at 25-26. 
Brass was trying to settle the case on behalf of Fieeiki with a resolution better than 
the plea in abeyance that would cause Fieeiki to lose his job as a peace officer. Defense 
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lawyers in plea negotiations often seek the best resolutions for their clients - pleas in 
abeyance, diversions, or dismissals. The fact that Fieiiki's lawyer was seeking such a 
favorable resolution of his case does not make the negotiations any less settlement 
negotiations, or any more an effort to aid in the investigation and prosecution of Fieeiki. 
Assuming arguendo that Fieeiki must point to something he was trying to give in 
the spirit ofquid pro quo, his continuing desire and willingness to serve as an excellent 
peace officer in our community should be recognized as such (R. 325: 148-53, 160-61, 
165). 
The City claims that Fieeiki never demonstrated a subjective belief that his 
statements were made for purposes of settlement, other than presenting "self-serving" 
statements at the hearing on the motion to suppress. City's brief at 19. Fieeiki had a 
constitutional right to testify on his own behalf, see Constitution of Utah, Article I §§ 7 
and 12; Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945), and the fact that his 
testimony aided his case does not diminish the credibility of his testimony. Fieeiki's 
testimony is not the only evidence of his subjective intent. His lawyer, Ed Brass, also 
repeatedly testified that Fieeiki's intent in attending and participating in the interview 
with Nudd and Torriente was to secure the favorable resolution of his case (e.g. R. 328: 5, 
25-26). 
The City's observation that Fieeiki was not charged, e.g.. City's brief at 19, should 
not weigh heavily in the analysis, given that Fieeiki had already been arrested and 
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removed from his home at the time that he went with his lawyer to talk with a prosecutor 
and police officer in the course of settling his case (R. 352: 101, 177). 
Because it is nonsensical and contradicted by the record, this Court should reject 
the City's and trial court's theory, that Fieeiki, an experienced police officer, and his 
experienced criminal defense attorney, Ed Brass, who were both fighting to save Fieeiki's 
job so he could continue to support his family of eight, would walk into the police station 
with the intent to aid in the investigation and prosecution which would doom Fieeiki's 
career. 
IV. 
THE ADMISSION OF FIEEIKI'S STATEMENTS 
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The City does not refute or address Fieeiki's argument that the admission of his 
statements to Torriente and Nudd should be viewed as structural error. Compare Fieeiki's 
opening brief at 29-30 with City's brief at 1-21. Fieeiki stands by that unrefuted 
argument. 
The City contends that the error in this case was harmless, because there were 
multiple witnesses to Fusina Fieeiki's physical injuries. City's brief at 20. 
The mere fact that Fusina was injured does not establish that Fieeiki was the cause 
of the injuries, or that he intentionally, knowingly or even recklessly inflicted them. 
The jurors, who convicted Fieeiki of the lesser included class B misdemeanor 
assault (R, 197), which was erroneously defined in the exact same terms as the class A 
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misdemeanor assault (R. 212, 217), were clearly sympathetic to Fieeiki. The jurors, who 
heard the testimony regarding the exhausting "Hell Week" Fieeiki was recovering from 
when his wife attacked him as he was sleeping, see Fieeiki's opening brief at 3-5, may 
well have concluded that he was not the cause of the injuries, or that he was not acting 
with the requisite intent, or that the prosecution did not disprove self defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, as the elements instruction required (R. 212). The admission of 
Fieeiki's statements made in the course of his efforts to compromise the case in a plea 
bargain effectively forced Fieeiki to testify, and shaped the entire trial, transforming a 
questionable case into a "slam dunk" for the prosecution (R. 328: 40). 
A new trial is thus in order. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should order a new trial wherein Mr. Fieeiki's statements to Torriente 
and Nudd are properly excluded. 
Respectfully submitted this July 31, 
Eliz^betl|Huri 
ansel f< 
n
Cou or Appelant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class 
postage pre-paid to the West Valley City Attorney, 3575 South Market Street, 2nd Floor, 
West Valley City, Utah 84119, this July 31, 2006. 
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ADDENDUM 
R. 328: 52 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES 
NOVEMBER 18, 2004 52 
in five minutes. 
THE COURT: It's up to you. 
MR. ROBINSON: Let's just call the 
witness. Sean Torriente will be my next witness. 
THE COURT: Okay. Bring him in. Wait a 
minute. Let's make sure we are on the record. 
MR. ROBINSON: You did not engage in plea 
negotiations with Mr. Brass other than what you may 
see on the record in the transcript? 
MR. DRAKE: I think the stipulation is, 
prior to the taped interview, there were no 
negotiations between Mr. Torriente and Mr. Brass. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: The transcript speaks for 
itself as to what occurred. 
MR. DRAKE: And the transcript speaks for 
itself. 
THE COURT: I'll accept that statement. 
MR. DRAKE: And also, I guess he's going 
to call Detective Nudd, or Mr. Nudd. But I think on 
that situation the transcript speaks for itself as to 
what he would testify to. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else that -
MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I do. I plan on 
inquiring about their conversation pretranscript 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
TESTIMONY OF ED BRASS 
NOVEMBER 18, 2004 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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10 
11 
12 
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the defense, being first sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DRAKE: 
Q. 
record . 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Would you please state your name for the 
It's Ed Brass. B-R-A-S-S. 
And what is your occupation? 
Lawyer. 
Did you represent one Stanley Fieeiki on 
-- prior to the 9th day of September 2003? 
A. I did. 
Q. And in what capacity were you retained by 
hi m? 
A. His lawyer. I acted as his lawyer in a 
pending criminal prosecution. 
Q. And you have heard today that a 
prosecution was pending against Mr. Fieeiki? 
A. I understood that an investigation had 
been conducted, and that it was being considered for 
charges by the West Valley City Attorney's office 
when I became involved. 
Q. And did you then contact anybody at the 
West Valley City Prosecutor's office about this case? 
A. I had several conversations before and 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
NOVEMBER 18, 2004 6 
after charges were filed with John Huber, who was 
then the West Valley City Prosecutor. 
Q. And that was prior to the charges being 
filed? 
A. Both before and after. 
Q. Now, did the West Valley City Prosecutor's 
office or Mr. Huber give you any type of a plea in 
the event charges would be filed? 
A. Yes. At some point in time, Mr. Huber 
proposed that this case could be resolved with a plea 
i n abeyance. 
There were also other discussions that 
preceded that about whether charges should be filed 
at all. Our hope, from the outset of the case, was 
that perhaps this case wouldn't be charged. 
Q. But if it were, then a plea in abeyance 
would be offered? 
A. Right. And again, remember, these were a 
number of different conversations. I couldn't tell 
you when they took place, but the very first 
conversations would have dealt with not charging at 
all. The next conversations would have been about, 
all right, if it's charged, then it will be a plea in 
abeyance . 
Q. And did those conversations occur prior to 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 the September 9th date? 
2 A. My recollection is that they did. 
3 Q. Was a meeting then ever arranged between 
4 Mr. Huber's office and the defendant and you? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And that was the meeting set for September 
7 the 9th, 2003? 
8 A. The date escapes me, but I'll take your 
9 word for it that that was the date. 
10 Q. According to the taped transcript, it does 
11 say --
12 A. I have no reason to take issue with that. 
13 I just don't have a specific recollection of it. 
14 Q. I understand. Now, what was the purpose 
15 of that meeting? 
16 A. The purpose of the meeting was for Mr. 
17 Fieeiki -- as I understood it, before we arrived, for 
18 Mr. Fieeiki to be able to present his side of the 
19 story, and so that the prosecutor's office could make 
20 a decision about what they were going to do with the 
21 case in terms of charging, and so that he could 
22 improve on the offer of a plea in abeyance. 
23 Q. So would you characterize this as 
24 settlement negotiations? 
25 A. That would be the only purpose in my mind 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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for making such a statement. 
Q. In fact --
MR. DRAKE: Your Honor, if I may approach 
your clerk. I have an Exhibit 1. 
MR. ROBINSON: I would wonder if we could 
propose to introduce the entire original transcript. 
Then you could then point out 
THE COURT: It's already been submitted to 
the Court. 
MR. ROBINSON: What has been submitted to 
the Court was a redacted transcript that included the 
things that we determined by stipulation not to admit 
to the jury. 
I think what he is attempting to admit to 
the Court today are the pages that were not going to 
be admitted to the jury. 
MR. BROWN: We don't have an objection to 
that, your Honor. We are just trying to make it --
focusing the Court's attention on the last few pages 
of the transcript that the Court previously had not 
received, dealing with some of the discussions, what 
had happened after that interview. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objection to 
the exhi bit? 
MR. ROBINSON: I wasn't certain that, you 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
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know, based on the fact you have the rest of the 
exhibit introduced already in evidence, I don't. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll admit Exhibit 
1. 
(DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT-1 WAS RECEIVED.) 
MR. DRAKE: And your Honor, we'd move for 
the admission of the Defendant's Exhibit 1. 
THE COURT: I have admitted that. 
Q. (By Mr. Drake) Now, Mr. Brass, if I could 
draw your attention to what has been marked on the 
Exhibit 1 as page 38, and it says: 
"Nudd --" 
Well, and then he says: 
"Well, those are all the things that I'm 
sure you will be bringing up, and you can 
talk to Mr. Huber about." 
And then you --
A. That's exactly what I was just telling you 
about. This is what it says: 
"I figured you guys would do this. Do you 
know what the time frame is you guys are 
working with?" 
And Mr. Nudd said, 
"Hopefully I'll have a decision on this 
rather quick now that we've got a 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 statement." 
2 "Okay, I'll write them. Thanks." 
3 Q. Going back to Nudd, "Now that we've got a 
4 statement," what was the decision that you were 
5 anticipating, again? 
6 A. One of two things. Again, what the charge 
7 would be, if anything. And whether or not an offer 
8 would be made that was something other than a plea in 
9 abeyance, because that would do Mr. Fieeiki no good. 
10 Q. Okay. Now, was there a prosecutor present 
11 at this meeting? 
12 A, Yes. 
13 Q. And do you recall his name? 
14 A. Sean Torriente. He is --
15 Q. And ~ 
16 A. — now with the County Attorney's office. 
17 Q. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt 
18 you. 
19 A. He now works for the District Attorney's 
20 office. He worked for the City Prosecutor's office 
21 at the time, is my understanding. 
22 Q. And this meeting was held where? 
23 A. In hi s offi ce. 
24 Q. And he was present during the whole of the 
25 conversation? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 A. He was present for the whole discussion. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. In fact, you have the transcript and I 
4 don't, but my recollection is that he may have even 
5 asked some questions or had been asked at one point 
6 did he desire to ask some questions. 
7 Q. Now, you had discussions with Mr. Fieeiki 
8 prior to going to this meeting? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Based upon what was stated by him to you, 
11 what would you say that his subjective interpretation 
12 of this meeting would have been? 
13 MR. ROBINSON: Objection. Speculation. 
14 THE COURT: Sustained. 
15 Q. (By Mr. Drake) Did Mr. Fieeiki verbalize 
16 to you an expectation of what this meeting -- the 
17 purpose of this meeting would be? 
18 A. He had two goals. The goals were --
19 MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the 
20 foundation, I'd like him to testify to what he 
21 stated, I think was the question. 
22 THE COURT: Yeah. The question, 
23 Mr. Brass, is did he state anything to you in terms 
24 of what his purpose was. 
25 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
NOVEMBER 18, 2004 12 
Q. (By Mr. Drake) And what did he state to 
you? 
A. He stated that he had two goals with 
respect to this meeting. The first was to see 
whether or not he would be charged at all, if he 
could persuade them not to do that. And the other is 
to make it clear to them what an impact this would 
have on his life, even if it was resolved with a plea 
in abeyance. 
MR. DRAKE: I have nothing further at this 
time . 
THE COURT: Cross? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
BY MR. ROBINSON 
Q. One of the items submitted in the motion 
in limine was a signed affidavit from September 1st 
of this year? 
A. Right. 
Q. Who prepared that affidavit? 
A. Not me. I don't know who prepared it. 
Q. You did not write that affidavit? 
A. No. I had the opportunity to make some 
alterations to it, and I think I did, but I didn't 
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prepare the original affidavit. 
Q. Okay. And you signed that affidavit on 
September 1st of 2004? 
A. Right. 
Q. So just under one year after --
A. Right. 
Q. -- most of this discussion had taken 
pi ace? 
A. Well, I don't know what you mean by "most 
of the discussion." I mean, one year -- roughly one 
year after the meeting took place, there were 
discussions before and after, like I say, so I don't 
Q. Okay. Is it fair to say that your 
recollection in September of 2004 is no longer 
complete as to the details of your conversations with 
Mr. Huber? 
A. Oh, what it would have been in September 
of 2003? 
Q. 
A. 
Yes 
Absolutely. I mean, I couldn't say that I 
could repeat verbatim what he said to me in 
September of 2003 or July or, you know, the time 
leading up to September, 2003, and the time 
afterwards. I can give you my best recollection. 
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That's it. I've done a few cases since then. 
Q. Sure. And you did testify that it was 
important to Mr, Fieeiki that he -- that you arranged 
for him this meeting to speak to the West Valley City 
Attorney ' s off i ce. 
A. It was very important to him because his 
job was in jeopardy. 
Q. Did he relate to you that some of that had 
to do with the -- maybe the briefness of the account 
he gave to the police at the scene? 
A. You know, that sounds sort of familiar to 
me, what you are saying. I mean, that seemed to be 
more in the context of a problem with his employer, 
which I was not handling, as opposed to the criminal 
problem. Something to do with some difficulty he 
might have had with the Highway Patrol. 
Q. So as you testified, you did contact 
Mr. Huber at his request? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And --
A, Pretty early on. I mean, almost as soon 
as I got the case. 
Q* And had multiple conversations with him. 
A. Right. 
Q. You've indicated one of those purposes 
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1 that you stated to John was to -- that Mr. Fieeiki 
2 wanted to present his side of the story so that -- in 
3 the hopes maybe charges wouldn't be filed? 
4 A. Right. 
5 Q. And I want to address, maybe, in more 
6 detail, your recollections of any discussion of a 
7 plea in abeyance. 
8 A. Right. 
9 Q. Is it a possibility that a plea in 
10 abeyance was not offered before this interview? 
11 l A, You know what? I won't say it's 
12 impossible, but the reason I remember it that way was 
13 because it seemed to me that in the conversation we 
14 had that was within days after the interview, after 
15 he had had a chance to talk, I assumed, to Mr. Nudd 
16 and Mr. Torriente, maybe even reviewed the tape 
17 themselves, what I remember about that conversation 
18 is he said he's not going to change the offer. The 
19 offer is not going to get any better. It is still a 
20 plea in abeyance. So it's that recollection that's 
21 strongest to me. And from that, you know, I infer 
22 that sometime prior to that is when it first came up. 
23 Q. Is it possible, based on your recollection 
24 of the conversations preceding September 9th, that it 
25 was more in the context of, "We'd like information so 
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we can decide what to charge and what to offer"? The 
decision hadn't been made for sure that a plea in 
abeyance was on the table? 
A. The way that you posed the question, I 
would say that's possible, because you know how it is 
that we operate in the criminal justice system. 
There's offers, and there's discussions, and there is 
"sort of" offers, and preliminary discussions to an 
offer. There's whole different stages in the 
negotiation process. So I wouldn't say what you just 
said was impossible, no. 
Q. And did you believe it was possible that a 
plea in abeyance might not be offered if this 
interview didn't go well? 
A. I certainly believe any time a person goes 
in and makes a statement, that there's at some risk 
that any offer that's been made or discussions about 
an offer could be withdrawn based on new information 
coming to light that they didn't previously know. 
That's always a risk. That's the way I'd have to 
answer that question. 
Q. Did you ask Mr. Huber not to file charges 
until the hearing, until this interview had taken 
place? 
A, Yes. I asked Mr. Huber many times not to 
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file charges. 
Q. But Mr. Huber dicing ever offer a specific 
plea in exchange for some sort of confession or 
showing of accountability by Mr. Fieeiki? 
A. Okay. I'm going to try and state to you 
the way I understand your question, so I'm clear. 
Are you saying was there ever a quid pro quo where it 
was, "You have to come in and say you did this and 
you are sorry in exchange for a specific offer"? No. 
That never happened. Absolutely, that never 
happened. 
Q. And you believe, but aren't certain, that 
a plea in abeyance had been --
A. Discussed before. 
Q. — formally offered? 
A. Formally offered? I honestly can't answer 
"formally offered." My impression was that that was 
an offer that had been made, and he could accept it 
if he chose to. There's problems with it for a 
police officer to do so because of the way the Police 
Officers' Standards and Training treats pleas in 
abeyance . 
So it's essentially -- if you are 
concerned about your job, it's essentially not an 
offer. I hope that answered your question. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
NOVEMBER 18, 2004 18 
Q. So from the very beginning, a plea in 
abeyance wasn't something he was interested in? 
MR. DRAKE: Objection, your Honor. It's 
unclear as to who "he" was interested in. 
Q, (By Mr. Robinson) It wasn't something 
your client was interested in, based on his 
communication with you. 
THE COURT: I'll allow the question as 
modified. Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: Well, the part that I have 
trouble with in the question is you say, "From the 
very beginning." I would say that's not true. I 
would say once the ramifications of what a plea in 
abeyance meant were explored, then it became 
something he was not interested in, yes. 
Q. So the time frame in which you were 
communicating with Mr. Huber, he knew a plea in 
abeyance wasn't of interest? 
A. Had tot at some point. Had to, because I 
told him so. I told Mr. Huber that. 
Q. Okay. You did know that John was --
Mr. Huber was the decision-maker as it related to 
charging decisions? 
A. Yes, absolutely. 
Q. And, eventually, on plea decisions? 
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A. Yeah. I thought he gave you guys a little 
bit of latitude there. 
Q. But specifically on this case. 
A. Yeah, I think he made that clear to me in 
this case. He did. That's fair. He did. 
I mean, this is a case that I guess, in 
part, because of Mr. Fieeiki's employment, and in 
part because we discussed it so early on, that he 
seemed to me to have taken a personal interest in it. 
I don't mean that in a negative way. It's just that 
he had hands on the file. He was accessible to me 
whenever I wanted to talk to him about it. It wasn't 
just a run-of-the-mill, one of the 10,000 cases I'm 
sure you process in your office every year. 
Q. Your arrangement to bring Mr. Fieeiki in, 
didn't include John being present; correct? 
A. No, it didn't, specifically. I mean, it 
wasn't ever anything that we talked about. But I do 
remember sort of being surprised that he wasn't 
there. But then again, I'm sure he had other things 
to do. But we never said, "Hey, you're going to be 
there, aren't you, John?" No, that just never came 
up. I just assumed that since he wanted to make this 
decision, he would be; that's all. 
Q. Especially in the context that if this 
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were to be treated as a plea negotiation, wouldn't 
you have expected John Huber to be there as the 
offerer of any plea? 
A. Not since he had a deputy there. Not 
since there was another lawyer there. If it had only 
been an investigator, I might have been more 
concerned. Since there was a lawyer there who was, 
at least to my recollection, invited to participate 
by asking questions, if he chose, I just figured 
there was some reason John couldn't be there that 
day . 
Q. At any time on September 9th, did you 
discuss different plea options with Sean Torriente or 
Kevin Nudd? 
A. No. 
Q. The entire context of the interview was to 
lay out on the table everything Mr. Fieeiki wanted us 
to know about what happened that night? 
A. That was definitely one of the purposes, 
wi thout question . 
Q. And Mr. Nudd led the interview? 
A. He did. 
Q. Before recording the interview, you had a 
discussion with Mr. Nudd as it related to the 
Mi randa ; correct? 
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A. Right. 
Q. And he discussed with you whether or not 
to Mirandize your client formally on the record? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you determined with him that that was 
not needed? 
A. Right. 
Q. And that was --
A. I think I specifically told him, either on 
the way up from downstairs or before the tape 
recorder was turned on, I don't recall which, that, 
look, he wasn't in custody; he had come in 
voluntarily; he was with a lawyer; he was a law 
enforcement officer, himself. For all those reasons, 
or for any one of those, I didn't think it was 
necessary for there to be any kind of Miranda 
warni ng. 
Q. Okay. 
A. He wasn't in custody. He'd come there on 
his own. He was free to leave any time he wanted to. 
He didn't need to be there. He didn't need to say 
anythi ng. 
Q. None of the reasons you stated to Mr. Nudd 
included that it would be inadmissible anyway, 
pursuant to a plea negotiation? 
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A. Nope. That didn't ever come up that day. 
That was never said. 
Q. Was Mr. Fieeiki present during this 
conversation off the record about the Miranda? 
A. He was never more than three feet away 
from me that entire morning, so I assume so. 
Q, Okay. And Mr. Nudd did record the 
i ntervi ew; cor rect? 
A. He did. 
Q. And at no time did you object to the 
interview being recorded? 
A. No. 
Q, And at the beginning of his --
MR. ROBINSON: If I could approach with a 
copy of the transcript that the Court already has 
admitted as evidence. 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. (By Mr. Robinson) Even after you had this 
conversation with Kevin Nudd, he did put on the 
record that you had reviewed -- he stated: 
"Having already reviewed with you and your 
attorney, Mr. Brass, I'm not going to read the 
Miranda rights to you;" correct? 
A. He did. 
Q. But he did discuss with — that he wanted 
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Mr. Fieeiki to understand that he had the right to 
talk to you and that you were present and that he was 
giving the statement willingly? 
A. He did say that. 
Q. That nothing -- he had not been coerced 
into giving the statement, for example? 
THE COURT: Mr. Robinson, the statement 
speaks for itself. I'm taking it, Mr. Drake, 
Mr. Brown, you have no objection to the Court 
receiving the exhibit that was previously admitted 
with the memorandums? 
MR. DRAKE: Well, your Honor, I was just 
looking through this exhibit to see if -- I haven't 
seen it. I don't know what he's handed to him unless 
i t'^ the redacted - -
THE COURT: I guess my point is I don't 
think that Mr. Brass needs to be asked questions that 
are part of the interview. 
MR. DRAKE: Fair enough. It's part of the 
record . 
THE COURT: It's part of the record, 
unless there is an objection. 
MR. DRAKE: I agree. 
THE COURT: I f t h e r e i s no o b j e c t i o n , 
t h e n , t o t he C o u r t r e c e i v i n g t h i s i n t e r v i e w t h a t ' s 
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previously been -- I'm not sure which side sent it to 
me, but it came in with one of the memorandums. 
MR. DRAKE: If I may just ask, your Honor, 
is the copy that you have redacted? Does it have X's 
through it? 
THE COURT: I don't believe so. 
MR. ROBINSON: I believe both the original 
and the redacted ones covered the information that I 
am referring to on page 1 and page 2. 
THE COURT: That was my point. I'm trying 
to save you some time. You don't need to go into 
that as part of the transcript. 
MR. ROBINSON: Fair enough. 
MR. BROWN: We have no objection, your 
Honor. It's my understanding that the copy the Court 
has is a redacted version. However, it is what we 
call a "clean copy." We worked through it with the 
prosecution, so we have no objection to that. 
THE COURT: All right. With that, I don't 
think there is any reason to ask Mr. Brass. That's 
part of the record. You can argue it when you deem 
appropriate . 
Q. (By Mr. Robinson) Your affidavit states 
that Mr. Fieeiki desired to meet with the prosecutor 
for settlement discussions. Do the words — well, 
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1 I'll leave that for argument, as well. Strike that. 
2 What do you recall about your conversation 
3 subsequent with Mr. Huber, subsequent to this 
4 interview? At any time did he make an offer --
5 A. Absolutely. What I told you earlier, and 
6 that was that a plea in abeyance was as good as it's 
7 going to get. And that offer remained open, to the 
8 best of my recollection, until -- I think it was 
9 open when I left the case, I think it was still open. 
10 MR. ROBINSON: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: Any redirect? 
12 I MR. DRAKE: Just a few, your Honor. 
13 
14 REDIRECT EXAMINATION. 
15 BY MR. DRAKE: 
16 Q. How long have you been a defense attorney? 
17 A. Just about 28 years. 
18 Q. So you wouldn't just have taken the 
19 defendant to the interview unless you expected this 
20 to be negotiations; correct? 
21 A. Well, it would be pointless to have him go 
22 in and just make a statement with no intended 
23 purpose. 
24 Q. R i g h t . Now, i n t h i s q u e s t i o n t h a t 
25 Mr. Rob inson asked you e a r l i e r , abou t g o i n g t o the 
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office and that sort of thing regarding the taking of 
the statement, did you -- you anticipated, though, at 
the beginning that this statement that was being 
taken was in furtherance of your discussions with 
Mr . Huber? 
A- There is no question that the purpose of 
the statement was to allow them to assess what they 
were going to do in terms of charging and settling 
the case. And/or settling the case. There's no 
question about i t. 
MR. DRAKE: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything else? All right. 
Thank you, Mr. Brass, for appearing. You are 
excused . 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Any more witnesses, Mr. Drake? 
MR. DRAKE: If I may have one moment. We 
have no more witnesses at this time, but we may have 
a rebuttal . 
THE COURT: That's fine. Mr. Robinson, 
you said you had some witnesses? 
MR. ROBINSON: I do. 
THE COURT: All right. Call your first 
wi tness, 
MR. ROBINSON: I'll call Mr. Huber. 
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that occurred. So I was reluctant and did not want 
to do that, 
Q. Did Mr. Brass ever, in his assurances to 
you that it would be okay to attend this meeting, 
ever make any statements to you to the effect that 
whatever you said there wouldn't be able to be used 
against you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He said that? 
A* Yes. On more than one occasion. As we 
were arriving at the Prosecutor's office and also as 
we were going upstairs. But he reassured me that 
everything would be okay, and he would take care of 
everything. 
Q. Your expectation, then, at the meeting was 
what? 
A. My expectation at the meeting was to tell 
them what had happened and to get this matter 
resolved by a dismissal, not by -- not accepting a 
plea in abeyance. Hopefully maybe something other 
than a plea in abeyance. But that was all that was 
on the table at that time. 
Q. And the purpose would be, then, for --
strike that. That's already been asked and answered. 
I have nothing further. 
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